

Appendix II

In this appendix we explore whether US diplomatic activism at the embassy level – i.e. a particular empirical implication of hegemonic effects – was a relevant condition for regime change in Latin America according to the logic of csQCA (crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis). We run two tests, one for breakdowns and another one for transitions from authoritarianism from 1945 to 2010, using csQCA analysis, a qualitative technique to address precisely that question.

Based on Boolean algebra and set theory, csQCA consists of a configurational comparative analysis of dichotomous variables – conditions that are either present or not – in a small number of cases. If every alternative condition related to a certain outcome has been introduced to the analysis, this method claims to determine the set of conditions that are necessary and/or sufficient for that outcome to take place within the sample. We relax this claim for reasons indicated in Seawright’s critique of QCA. We do not claim causality, which is implied by the analysis of necessary or sufficient conditions. Even so, csQCA can show whether Condition A was present in all cases in which outcome Y occurred, or whether in all cases in which Condition A was absent, outcome Y did not occur. Only in conjunction with process tracing of the cases is it reasonable to make claims about sufficient and/or necessary conditions based on the results of csQCA (see Appendix III).

The first step is to dichotomize the main variables and controls. The dependent variable or outcome of interest in Test 1 is the occurrence of a breakdown and in Test 2 a transition to a competitive regime, which we code “1” if it occurred in a certain country year and “0” if it did not. For Test 1, we include every country-year that experiences a breakdown. Conversely, for Test 2, we include every country year that experiences a transition.

To analyze these samples and see which conditions are relevant and which not, we also need relevant “0” cases, in which the outcome did not happen. To do so, we take an approach similar to matching techniques in quantitative analysis and look for country-years that can function as good counterfactuals – i.e. countries where breakdowns or transitions were most-likely to happen and yet did not occur.

To select these counterfactual cases for comparison, we include a set of relevant alternative conditions or confounders, following the analysis and the dataset provided by Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013). According to this work, regime change could have occurred because of normative preferences towards democracy, which we consider positive if scoring more than 0.35; opposition radicalism, considered high if over .5; economic crises if GDP growth was negative; and high inflation if the natural logarithm of the inflation rate is greater than 0.75. Applying these filters, we get to a subset of cases (country-years) more likely to be associated with regime change. For the analysis of breakdowns we use counterfactual cases from 1945 to 1977 – a period that was favorable to breakdowns. Conversely, for the analysis of transitions, we select counterfactual cases from the 1977 to 2010 period, which was more favorable to democratization. The continuous versions of all these dichotomized conditions are available in Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013).

Finally, we coded US embassy involvement differently for breakdowns and episodes of democratization. For democratic transitions, we consider that the US

embassy was involved if it publicly favored a democratic transition during that year *and* there is no further evidence that the embassy was involved in any non-democratic practice such as supporting a guerrilla movement during that same year. For breakdowns, we considered that the US embassy was involved if it publicly criticized the democratic government previous to the coup *and* immediately recognized the new authoritarian regime.

For Test 1, we selected all breakdowns in the Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán dataset from 1945 to 2010 (27 cases). We added another 18 cases in which conditions for a breakdown to occur were favorable but breakdown did not, selected randomly from a list. After we ran a necessity test using Kirq using a consistency threshold of 1 and a coverage threshold of .75, one configuration is consistently related to the outcome (breakdown) and US embassy support is not a relevant condition in it.

Truth Table 1. Conditions for Democratic Breakdowns, 1945-2010

Democratic Preferences	Opposition Radicalism	Negative Growth	High Inflation	Embassy Support	N	Consistency	Outcome
True	True	False	False	False	1	0	Status Quo
False	True	False	False	False	6	0	Status Quo
True	True	True	False	False	2	0.5	Contradiction
False	False	False	False	False	7	0.57	Contradiction
False	True	True	False	False	4	0.75	Contradiction
False	False	True	True	False	4	0.75	Contradiction
True	False	True	True	False	1	1	Breakdown
True	False	True	False	False	4	1	Breakdown
True	False	False	True	False	2	1	Breakdown
True	False	False	False	False	2	1	Breakdown
False	True	True	True	False	1	1	Breakdown
False	False	True	False	False	4	1	Breakdown
True	True	False	False	True	2	0	Status Quo
False	True	True	False	True	1	0	Status Quo
False	True	False	False	True	2	0	Status Quo
True	True	True	True	True	1	1	Breakdown
True	False	True	True	True	1	1	Breakdown

Source: elaborated by the authors using the csQCA software Kirq (Reichert & Rubinson 2014).

Notes: This analysis draws on an N of 45 cases. 27 cases correspond to breakdowns. These cases are Costa Rica (1948), Panama (1948 and 1968), Peru (1948, 1962, 1968, and 1992), Venezuela (1948 and 2009), Colombia (1949), Argentina (1951, 1962, 1966, and 1976), Cuba (1952), Guatemala (1954), Ecuador (1963 and 1970), Honduras (1963 and 1972), Bolivia (1964 and 1980), Brazil (1964), Honduras (1972 and 2009), Chile (1973), Uruguay (1973), and Haiti (1999). The other 18 cases could have ended in a breakdown and were selected to control for theoretically relevant independent variables. These are Guatemala (1950 and 1953), Chile (1966 and 1971), Brazil (1950), Ecuador (1954), Peru (1964 and 1966), Argentina (1964 and 1975), Colombia (1974), Panama (1962 and 1966), Honduras (1961), Bolivia (1962 and 1963), Venezuela (1964 and 1965).

In Test 2 we followed a similar procedure. First, we considered all 37 transitions to competitive regimes in the Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán data set from 1945 to 2010. Second, we selected all country-years after 1977 in which democratization was most-

likely to have occurred given the confounders highlighted above, but did not occur. Finally, we randomly selected 22 cases of non-transitions from this shortlist and drew them into the analysis together with our 37 positive cases.

In Test 2 we again run a necessity test with consistency threshold 1 and coverage of .75. For any configuration to pass the test – i.e. for any configuration to be deemed relevant given these parameters – two things must happen: a) the outcome has to be associated with it 100% of the time (every time the outcome happens the condition must be present) – and, conversely, the condition must be sufficient for producing the outcome at least 75% of the time. US embassy support is the only condition deemed necessary and close to sufficient. This means that every time a transition took place, the US embassy favored it, and 83% or the times the US embassy took this posture, a transition occurred.

Truth Table 2: Conditions for Democratic Transitions, 1945-2010

Democratic Preferences	Opposition Radicalism	Negative Growth	High Inflation	Embassy Support	N	Consistency	Outcome
True	False	True	True	True	2	0.5	Contradiction
True	False	False	True	True	3	0.67	Contradiction
False	True	True	False	True	11	0.73	Contradiction
True	True	True	False	True	1	0	Status Quo
True	False	True	False	True	2	0	Status Quo
True	False	True	False	False	1	0	Status Quo
False	True	True	True	False	2	0	Status Quo
False	True	True	False	False	3	0	Status Quo
False	True	False	True	False	1	0	Status Quo
False	True	False	False	False	2	0	Status Quo
False	False	True	False	False	2	0	Status Quo
False	False	False	False	False	3	0	Status Quo
True	False	False	False	True	6	1	Transition
False	True	True	True	True	3	1	Transition
False	True	False	True	True	2	1	Transition
False	True	False	False	True	5	1	Transition
False	False	True	True	True	1	1	Transition
False	False	True	False	True	2	1	Transition
False	False	False	True	True	1	1	Transition
False	False	False	False	True	6	1	Transition

Source: elaborated by the authors using the csQCA software Kirq (Reichert & Rubiinson 2014).

Notes: This analysis draws on an N of 59 cases. 37 cases correspond to successful transitions: Panama (1945, 1956, and 1990), Guatemala (1945 and 1986), Argentina (1946, 1958, 1963, 1973, and 1983), Bolivia (1956, 1979, and 1982), Brazil (1946 and 1985), Ecuador (1948, 1968, and 1979), Costa Rica (1949), Dominican Republic (1978), Peru (1956, 1963, 1980, and 1995), Honduras (1957, 1971, and 1982), Nicaragua (1984), El Salvador (1984), Uruguay (1985), Mexico (1988), Paraguay (1989), Chile (1990), and Haiti (1995 and 2006). The other 22 correspond to cases of absent transitions selected to control for theoretically relevant conditions: Argentina (1977 and 1982), Bolivia (1978), Brazil (1980 and 1984), Peru (1977 and 1992), Mexico (1979, 1985 and 1986), El Salvador (1978), Haiti (1989 and 1992), Guatemala (1984), Cuba (1980, 1989 and 2000), Panama (1980), Nicaragua (1980), Chile (1982), Paraguay (1980) and Uruguay (1983).

In both Tests 1 and 2, a sufficiency test produces contradictory results, showing that US involvement was not sufficient for breakdowns or transitions to occur. Truth Table 2 reveals that there were at least three equivalent configurations that led to contradictory results. Moreover, there are two configurations (accounting for 3 cases) in which US pro-democratic involvement is consistently related to the preservation of the authoritarian status quo. Substantively, this means there are cases where US involvement was not sufficient to produce democracy, although it was necessary – within the limits of our sample and not considering the logical remainders – i.e. all possible alternative configurations of factors or possible counterfactuals that remain unobserved.